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 Chapter 4 
 Re -forming a Meritorious Elite. Judicial 
Independence, Selection of Judges 
and the High Council of Justice in Belgium 
 Maurice  Adams and  Benoît  Allemeersch 
 Abstract  Maintaining the independence of the judiciary against the infl uence of 
the legislative and executive powers requires a constant alertness, even more so in 
our modern societies where the legislative and executive branch are often intimately 
connected. This article looks into the way this problem is being dealt with in 
Belgium. It does so from the angle of the Belgian High Council of Justice, created 
in 2000 to fulfi l a key role in establishing and maintaining judicial independence, 
especially from the political sphere. Since judicial independence, and the way it is 
reached, cannot be seen in isolation from a broader background, the necessary 
attention is given to the specifi cs of the Belgian context that gave rise to the estab-
lishment of the High Council, before evaluating the creation of such an institution 
as a means to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. To evaluate the impact of 
the establishment of the High Council of Justice, the authors fi rst distinguish four 
types of judicial independence: individual, internal, extra-institutional and institu-
tional independence. The authors conclude that external monitoring of the judiciary 
can, in a modern welfare state, be a legitimate policy to be pursued by the legislative 
and executive powers. The judiciary, as an institution, can thus be held accountable 
for its performance by means of a High Council. This is partly a matter of checks 
and balances. At the same time, alertness is required to ensure that under the pre-
tence of checks and balances no new unchecked positions are being taken up. 
Therefore, the Belgian High Council of Justice should not perform its duties in a 
vacuum; it should itself be monitored and be held accountable, for example, by the 
public, by a free press or even by the judiciary itself (e.g., the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
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1  Setting the Stage: A ‘Hamiltonian’ Paradox 
 As the Dutch constitutional scholar Tim Koopmans once observed, one of the 
 prominent characteristics of modern constitutionalism is that it is developing into 
what he called a bipolar model: the idea of the  Trias Politica , which has been deter-
minative for the  institutional layout of so many democratic states, is changing into a 
division between the judiciary on the one hand and the legislative and executive bod-
ies on the other. 1 The  Trias Politica might therefore today be better described as  Duas 
Politica . In any case, the legislative and executive powers are in practice so inti-
mately connected that the traditional supervisory function of parliament is less well 
developed than constitutional theory would have it. As a result, the main characteris-
tic that distinguishes the courts (the judiciary) from the legislative and executive 
bodies is, or should be, its independence from the legislative and executive sphere. 
 All this makes the classic statement, in the Federalist Papers, by Alexander Hamilton, 
one of the founding fathers of American constitutionalism, particularly interesting. 
Hamilton, it is well known, deemed the judicial power to be the ‘least dangerous’ branch 
of government within the  Trias Politica : ‘Whoever attentively considers the different 
departments of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated 
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity 
to annoy or injure them’. 2 By this he meant that in principle – and optimistically, we 
add – the judicial power cannot seriously infringe citizens’ rights because the courts 
enjoy neither the legislature’s wide law- making powers nor the executive’s prerogative 
to implement policies. Furthermore, Hamilton said, unless the judicial power itself is the 
sovereign in a state, it is always reliant on the other powers for its fi nances (power of the 
purse). It can, moreover, only enforce its judgements with the executive’s help (power 
of the sword). Hamilton astutely observed that ‘[the judicial power] may truly be said to 
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm, even for the effi cacy of its judgments.’ 3 
1  T Koopmans,  Courts and Political Institutions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
247–250. This is of course just one way of describing how constitutionally relevant institutions can 
be looked at. Today we might as well speak about  multiple politica , where complexity is the watch-
word: there is an ‘increasingly interactive process … taking place in the area of constitutional devel-
opment between the legislature and judiciary and between national, European and international 
actors amongst themselves, as well as between actors within the rule of law and those outside’, see A 
Meuwese and M Snel, ‘Constitutional dialogue: an overview’ (2013)  Utrecht Law Review 135. 
2  Federalist Papers , no 78. 
3  ibid . 
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 Yet, interestingly enough, Hamilton also agreed with Montesquieu who, in his 
 De l’Esprit des Lois (1758), stated: ‘there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not 
separated from the legislative and executive [powers]’. 4 And this is why Hamilton at 
the same time believed that ‘all possible care is requisite to enable [the judicial 
power] to defend itself against their attacks’. 5 
 So while Hamilton seemed to diminish the role of the judiciary by calling it the 
‘least dangerous’ of the powers, a branch that was dependent moreover on the good-
will of the two other powers, he did paradoxically at the same time stress its  crucial 
importance as an independent actor in establishing a free society. 
 In this chapter, we will look at how this paradox is being dealt with in Belgium 
today, i.e., if and how the independence of the Belgian judiciary is maintained and 
safeguarded against the infl uence (‘attacks’, to use Hamilton’s word) of the legisla-
tive and executive powers. 6 We will do so from the angle of the establishment and 
working of the so-called High Council of Justice ( Conseil Supérieur de la Justice , 
operational since 2000). The High Council is an institution that through various com-
petences is supposed to fulfi l a key role in establishing and maintaining judicial inde-
pendence, especially from the political sphere. The High Council is only concerned 
with the ‘ordinary’ judiciary (in civil and criminal matters), and not with the Belgian 
 Cour Constitutionnelle or  Conseil d’Etat . The last two courts will not be dealt with 
in this chapter. Also, mechanisms to safeguard independence in institutions that per-
form court-like functions, like, e.g., disciplinary bodies, are not considered here. 
 To be able to investigate the aforementioned paradox, we will start with devot-
ing ample space to the events preceding the establishment of the High Council of 
Justice; we are convinced that a legal system, including its  institutional and con-
stitutional organisation and layout, can only be fully understood and appreciated 
if it is also seen as the result of a particular  problem with which it has to deal. 
This, it will be shown, also explains why in this chapter the High Council of 
Justice is the angle through which the topic of judicial independence in Belgium 
is approached. This also provokes a very important qualifi cation, which might be 
summarized in the following phrase: ‘Do not necessarily try this at home!’ In this 
respect, MacDonald and Kong rightly state that judicial independence is a so-
called ‘essentially contested concept’, 7 which can moreover be reached by differ-
4  Montesquieu,  The Spirit of the Laws , in the famous Chapter 6 of Book XI (for an English transla-
tion, see  http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch17s9.html ). On this, see E 
Barendt,  An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) 129. 
5  Federalist Papers , no 78. 
6  This is a central concern of judicial independence, although not the only one. MacDonald and 
Kong defi ne judicial independence more broadly as ‘judges are independent when they decide by 
taking into account all relevant considerations, by not considering irrelevant considerations, by not 
acting to achieve an improper purpose, and by not acting to achieve a purely personal objective’, 
R MacDonald and H Kong, ‘Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Virtue’ in M Rosenfeld and 
A Sajó (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 832. 
7  This phrase was coined in a seminal paper published nearly 60 years ago by British philosopher 
WB Gallie. Essentially contested concepts are concepts ‘the proper use of which inevitably 
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ent means:  formal and informal mechanisms, institutionalized and customary 
norms, ex ante and ex post mechanisms, substantive and procedural norms. To an 
even greater extent, much of the effectiveness of these means relates to, and 
depends on, the  institutional and cultural factors that are central to establishing 
and promoting what they call ‘judicial virtue’, a phrase pointing to a number of 
considerations relating to the actual performance of the role of judge (courage, 
integrity, etc.). 8 Judicial independence is, fi nally, always invoked in a specifi c 
social, economic, and political context, and what is good for one country might 
not be good for another. Given all these qualifi cations, it is wise to read and try to 
understand the descriptive and taxonomic parts of this chapter, and also its con-
clusions, in line with the specifi c context in which the Belgian High Council was 
established and has to function. 
2  Some Preliminary History 
 A decade or so ago, an intense and even vehement debate raged in Belgium, a highly 
affl uent country to be sure, on the legitimacy and independence of the judiciary. The 
debate started with what became known as the ‘Spaghetti judgement’ of the Belgian 
 Cour de cassation —the highest national court in civil and criminal matters—in which 
an investigating judge ( juge d’instruction ) was withdrawn from a high-profi le case. 9 
 The decision was the direct result of the arrest of Marc Dutroux, the perverse 
murderer of a number of Belgian children. He was arrested on 13 August 1996, after 
a young girl who had been kidnapped 6 days before was found in the basement of his 
home, along with another girl who had been there for almost 3 months. It turned out 
that they had been kept in a hidden cell in Dutroux’s house under ghastly conditions. 
It soon became evident that Dutroux was also responsible for the abduction and 
death of at least four other children, and for the death of one of his accomplices. 
 The rescue of the children was at least partly the result of the investigations and 
interventions supervised by the aforementioned investigating judge, whose efforts 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’, WB Gallie, ‘Essentially 
Contested Concepts’ (1956)  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167–198. 
8  MacDonald and Kong, ‘Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Virtue’ 833 857. 
9  In Belgium a  juge d’instruction has to prepare a case for both the defence and the prosecution. He 
leads the judicial investigation, and to that end instructs the police investigators. It is the duty of the 
investigating judge to gather evidence not only against ( à charge ) but also in favour ( à décharge ) 
of the suspect. The statutory position of an investigating judge is rather ambiguous, since he is at 
the same time an offi cer of the judicial police and a magistrate; he has, after all, to track down 
suspects and protect the victims against them, which makes it diffi cult for him to be impartial in 
this sense. On the other hand, an investigating judge does not have the powers of a judge on the 
bench; he does not adjudicate cases on their merits and is therefore not an ordinary judge in the 
regular sense of the word. He neither rules on the guilt of a suspect, nor on the punishment or 
degree of punishment, or on possible compensation for victims. He only rules on matters related to 
the investigation. 
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made him a national hero. It was also clear that the Belgian police had committed 
major errors, without which the crimes would most likely not have occurred. For 
example, the police had been present at Dutroux’s house while the two girls were 
still being held there, but had found nothing on that occasion. Moreover, it became 
known that in 1992 Dutroux had been released from prison after having served a 
mere 3 years of a 13-year conviction for child rape. And fi nally, it turned out that the 
police had been aware for a long time that in 1993 Dutroux had been building cells 
in his home, which would later be used to incarcerate the children. 
 Sometime after the aforementioned children had been freed, the investigating 
judge was invited, together with the public prosecutor, to be a guest of honour at a 
fundraiser for the defence of one of the victims. One of the two surviving girls also 
attended. The party was an informal event, had not been broadly publicized, and had 
been organized by a foundation that sympathized with the victims of child abuse 
and had itself fi led a civil claim for damages against Dutroux. At the party, the 
investigating judge was offered a meal (a plate of spaghetti) and was presented with 
a pen that had been bought that evening in a small neighbourhood shop as a kind of 
improvised gift. 
 The presence of the investigating judge at this gathering did of course attract 
media attention, and subsequently, led to Dutroux’s lawyer fi ling an objection notice 
challenging the investigating judge, 10 questioning his independence and impartiality 
and seeking his removal. Two weeks later, the investigating judge was taken off the 
case by the Belgian  Cour de cassation . According to the Court, by accepting the 
meal and the gift the investigating judge appeared to be biased in the eyes of both 
the suspects and the general public. It was therefore impossible for him to perform 
his task objectively, impartially and independently. The Court more specifi cally 
stated:
 …that the essential condition of impartiality of the investigating judge is his complete inde-
pendence in regard to the parties, so that he does not expose himself to a suspicion of par-
tiality with regard to his examination of the facts, whether it be in favour of the defence or 
the prosecution; that the investigating judge should not at any moment lose the ability to 
create in the minds of the parties or in the public opinion an appearance of impartiality; 
[and] that no circumstance, however exceptional, might relieve him of this obligation. 11 
10  In this article we shall understand these terms – independence and impartiality – not quite as 
synonyms, but as closely interrelated terms nevertheless. We do not see independence as an ulti-
mate value in itself, but instrumental in safeguarding another more ultimate value: impartiality, in 
the sense of having a decision taken by a third person who cannot be considered to have an interest 
in the case. On this relation, see M Cappelletti,  The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) 70–71. A judge who cannot decide a case independently by defi -
nition cannot be impartial. The European Court of Human Rights seems to confi rm this view, when 
it says that ‘the concepts of independence and objective impartiality are closely linked.’ See, eg, 
European Court of Human Rights , Kleyn et al v the Netherlands , ECHR, Nos 39 343/98, 2003-VI 
(6 May 2003), para 192. 
11  Cour de cassation , 14 October 1996,  Arresten Cassatie 1996, 379 (the Court ratifi ed its decision 
some months later, on 11 December 1996, in civil proceedings). Translations in this paper are by 
the authors. 
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 Moreover, the Court said:
 That the investigating judge who has been entertained by one party at this party’s expense 
or has accepted gifts from this party, and has thus shown his sympathy for this party, places 
himself in an impossible position to conduct the case involving this party without raising 
with the other parties, the suspect in particular, and third parties, a suspicion in respect of 
his ability to fulfi l his task in an objective and impartial way. 12 
 In its rhetorical manifestation, the judgement followed a forceful logic of its own 
that could not but result in a conclusion that inevitably seemed to follow from the 
facts. The Court strictly adhered to the letter of the law—or at least gave that impres-
sion—intimating that there was no scope for interpretation. At the same time, how-
ever, the Court did deal creatively with at least certain aspects of the case. In the 
opinion of many respected academics and legal practitioners, 13 the Court had made 
choices that were not legally inevitable. Contested issues included the meaning of 
the concept of impartiality, the proper function of an investigating judge, and the 
meaning of Article 828 of the Belgian Judicial Code and Article 542 of the Belgian 
Code of Criminal Procedure (the legal basis of the Court’s decision). 
 The judgement of the Belgian  Cour de cassation sent shockwaves of indignation 
throughout the country. Demonstrations were held, factories went on strike, and 
editorials condemned the Court decision and, more generally, the cold mentality of 
the judges. The public outrage culminated in the so-called White March, a demon-
stration of hundreds of thousands of people (some 3 % of the Belgian population!) 
marching through the streets of Brussels protesting against the justice system in 
general and the judiciary system specifi cally. 14 Popular confi dence in the system of 
justice was at an all-time low. 
 It is almost ironic that the Court’s very argument of judicial impartiality and 
independence caused an enormous public uproar because of the publicly perceived 
lack of impartiality and independence of the judiciary. What is more, the political 
elite was criticized severely for having neglected, fi nancially and otherwise, the 
justice system for years. For example, well into the 1990s, appointments to the judi-
ciary had an undeniably political dimension. Although formally judges were 
appointed by the Minister of Justice, each political party could nominate candidates 
in proportion to their representation in parliament. While the reason for this appoint-
ment procedure was that it was thought wise to have a more or less representative 
judiciary, 15 the result was a rather politicized judiciary, with judges who were not 
necessarily appointed on the basis of their expertise. 
12  ibid . 
13 A survey of the legal aspects of the case can be found in W Van Gerven, ‘Creatieve rechtspraak’ 
(1997–1998)  Rechtskundig Weekblad 214–217 and, more generally, in F Delpérée, ‘Quelques pro-
pos sur la justice et la politique’ (1997)  Journal des Tribunaux 69. Both authors are rather critical 
of the decision by the  Cour de cassation . 
14 An interesting sociological analysis of the White March can be found in S Walgrave and J 
Manssens, ‘The Making of the White March: The Mass Media as a Mobilizing Alternative to 
Movement Organizations’ (2000)  Mobilization 217. 
15  Representative of the available political spectrum that is, i.e., not being fully cut loose from the 
political sentiments amongst the population. Such a judiciary had been an ardent wish since the 
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 We do not suggest that the Court’s decision itself was the fundamental cause of 
social dissatisfaction, but it was nevertheless the catalyst for popular dissatisfac-
tion with the administration of justice and the judicial system. In the public’s 
opinion, and also partly as a result of its formalistic reasoning style, the Court 
seemed to pre- empt all discussion and thus turn a blind eye to societal arguments 
in order to keep the aforementioned investigating judge in place. Many people 
believed the highest judges of the country to be involved in a political cover-up. 
To many the  Cour de cassation , in its judgment, symbolized the problems ram-
pant in the country’s justice system: a product of a political system whose manoeu-
vrings had made it lose contact with ‘reality’. As a matter of fact, the popular 
feeling was that the Belgian judiciary suffered from judicial  de pendence (on the 
political branch, to be sure). 16 
 The political upshot of all of this was that in April 1998, after Dutroux managed 
to escape from custody for a few hours, eight Belgian political parties agreed that a 
fundamental reform of the Belgian judicial system was urgently needed. All this 
suggests that, lofty constitutional and court-confi rmed principles notwithstanding, 
judicial independence also has a strong sociological component; justice must not 
only be done, but it must also very clearly and explicitly  perceived to be done. The 
shake-up of the Belgian judiciary system was from this point of view necessary to 
restore the Belgian public’s confi dence in the judicial system, 17 since that is indeed 
the bedrock of judicial independence. 18 
 One of the most important and direct results of the political agreement to restruc-
ture the national system of the administration of justice was the establishment in 
1998, by way of constitutional reform, of the High Council of Justice. Elsewhere in 
Europe, comparable institutions have long been in existence. Italy has had a similar 
institution since 1947, as has France since 1958 (headed by the President of the 
Republic), and Spain since 1977. The powers and competences of these authorities 
differ, but the general aim of all is to restrict the infl uence of the executive branch 
on the judicial branch. At the same time, however, the very nature of these councils 
establishment of the Belgian state in 1830. See J Gilissen, ‘L’ordre judiciaire en Belgique au début 
de l’indépendance (1830–1832)’ (1983)  Journal de Tribunaux 596 and J-P Nandrin, ‘L’acte de 
fondation des nominations politiques de la magistrature. La Cour de cassation à l’aube de 
l’indépendance belge’ (1998)  Revue belge d’Histoire contemporaine 153. 
16  Interestingly, the previously cited Montesquieu advocated judicial independence not only to pro-
tect the judiciary from political trespassing, but also to protect the public from judges with too 
much power! If the judicial power ‘were … joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression’, Montesquieu, Montesquieu,  The Spirit of Laws , ch 6 Book XI (‘Of 
the Constitution of England’). 
17  Whether the shake-up was successful is an issue that will not be dealt with in this article. Even 
so, in recent years, popular confi dence rate signifi cantly improved. According to recent research, 
in 2010 61 % and in 2007 66 % of the Belgians said they had confi dence in the justice system. Five 
years before, this was barely two out of fi ve Belgians (41 %), see Conseil supérieur de la justice, 
 Les Belges et la justice en 2010. Les résultats du deuxième baromètre de la justice en Belgique 
(Brussels, Bruylant, 2010) 83. 
18  K Malleson,  The New Judiciary. The Effects of Expansion and Activism (Aldershot, Ashgate 
Press, 1999) 78. 
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poses a  potential threat to judicial independence . After all, one of their tasks is to 
monitor the performance of the judiciary. 
3  The Belgian Constitution and Judicial Independence 19 
 The answer of the Belgian political class to the problems described in the previous 
paragraph was motivated by a clearly felt need to get rid of improper political infl u-
ence on the judiciary and effect change in how the Belgian judicial system was 
organized. Still, at the same time the Belgian legislature was very much aware of the 
need for the High Council to be in accordance with principles of judicial indepen-
dence because – to quote one Senator – ‘The independence of the judiciary is the 
cornerstone of a democratic  rechtsstaat , and safeguards the separation of 
powers’. 20 
 Before the 1998 constitutional reform, judicial independence as such had not 
been explicitly guaranteed, although the Belgian Constitution did contain provi-
sions that effectively made judicial independence possible. Article 152 of the 
Constitution, for example, guaranteed (and guarantees) appointment for life for 
judges:
 The judges are appointed for life. They are retired at an age determined by law, at which 
they are awarded a pension determined by law. A judge can only be removed from offi ce or 
suspended after a judicial procedure. A judge can only be transferred after a new appoint-
ment to which he agrees. 
 Article 154 determines that the salaries of judges are to be set by law, and Article 
155 stipulates that judges are not allowed to accept paid positions from the 
government. 
 In addition, even before the constitutional reform, judicial independence had 
been accepted as a legal principle by the Belgian  Cour de cassation as well as the 
Belgian  Cour Constitutionnelle . 21 Judicial independence is also acknowledged in 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6) and in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14), to both of which Belgium is a 
party. 
19  On this, see, e.g., A Alen and K Muylle,  Handboek van het Belgisch Staatsrecht (Mechelen, 
Kluwer, 2011) 599 ff.; F Fleerackers and R Van Ransbeeck,  Recht en Onafhankelijkheid. 
Gerechtelijke macht in perspectief ,  AdVocare Series (Brussels, Larcier, 2008); J Velaers, ‘De onaf-
hankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht na de recente herziening van de Grondwet’ (2000) 
 Limburgs Rechtsleven 373–400 and P Van Orshoven, ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de rechter naar 
Belgisch recht’ in P Van Orshoven, LFM Verhey and K Wagner,  De onafhankelijkheid van de rech-
ter (Deventer, Tjeenk Willink, 2001) 77. 
20  Parliamentary Proceedings,  Senate 1998–99, no 1-1121/3, 7. 
21  Cour de cassation 13 January 1986,  Arresten Cassatie 1985–86, 665;  Cour d’Arbitrage 10 June 
1998,  Belgisch Staatsblad 12 September 1998, no 67/98. The Belgian  Cour d’Arbitrage was 
renamed  Cour Constitutionnelle in 2007. 
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 Since the 1998 constitutional reform, 22 judicial independence is explicitly 
 mentioned several times in the Belgian Constitution. For example, § 1 of Article 151 
now reads:
 The judges are independent in the exercise of their competency. The public prosecution is 
independent in its individual investigation, although the competent minister is allowed to 
order prosecution and to set up binding guidelines of criminal policy, including prosecuto-
rial policies. 
 The most elaborate change was the introduction of a new Article 151, § 2 in the 
Constitution, which established the High Council of Justice:
 §2. There is in Belgium one High Council of Justice. This Council respects the indepen-
dence of the judiciary as mentioned in §1. 
 The High Council of Justice consists of one Dutch-speaking and one French- speaking 
college. Each college has an equal amount of members and each consists on the one hand 
of an equal amount of judges and civil servants of the public prosecution that are chosen 
directly among their peers… On the other hand the members are appointed by the Senate 
with a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast… 
 Within each college there is an appointment and indication committee and one advisory 
and research committee, with the same balanced composition as above… 
 §3. The High Council of Justice is competent for:
  1.  The nomination of candidates for an appointment as judge… or as a civil servant of 
the public prosecution; 
  2.  The nomination of candidates for the functions of [president of any regular court or 
the function of chief of the public prosecution]. 
  3.  Access to the position as a judge or civil servant of the public prosecution; 
  4.  Educating judges and civil servants of the public prosecution; 
  5.  Setting up standard profi les for the functions mentioned in point 2; 
  6.  Providing advice and formulating proposals concerning the working and the organi-
zation of the judicial power; 
  7.  The supervision of and the advancement of the use of internal control mechanisms; 
  8.  With the exceptions of the normal disciplinary and criminal competences:
 –  Receiving and following-up of complaints concerning the working of the judicial 
power; 
 –  Researching the working of the judicial power… 
 The challenge to maintain and safeguard the independence of the Belgian judi-
ciary against the infl uence of the legislative and executive powers however, has 
since become ever more acute in the aftermath of what became known as the Fortis 
demise. 
 Fortis was a multinational banking and insurance group which, due to the effects 
of the fi nancial crises in September 2008 and after the Belgian Government’s inter-
vention, was dissolved and sold to a French competitor. 23 Since the shareholders had 
not been consulted on the sale, summary proceedings were begun before the 
President of the Brussels Commercial Court ( Tribunaux de commerce ) and, on 
appeal, before the Brussels Court of Appeal ( Cour d’appel ). Due to a confl ict which 
22 Act of 20 November 1998 amending the Constitution,  Belgisch Staatsblad 24 November 1998. 
23  For an overview of these events (from a corporate and fi nancial law perspective), see ‘De zaak 
Fortis’ (2009) 2  Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap , 156–158 and 429–430. 
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arose between the three judges handling the case in the Court of Appeal, one judge 
refused to sign the judgment, triggering a hectic and confusing series of consulta-
tions involving the President of the Court of Appeal, the President of the Court of 
Cassation, the offi ces of the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Finance and the 
Prime Minister and the Prosecutor-General of the Court of Appeal. When judgment 
was pronounced by only two judges, an unprecedented sequence of events unfolded, 
where the Minister of Justice resigned after refusing to direct the Prosecutor-General 
of the Court of Appeal to submit the case for an extraordinary review by the  Cour 
de cassation . Soon afterwards, the Government resigned too, after letters from the 
Prime Minister and the President of the  Cour de cassation were published that 
revealed contacts between government offi cials and prosecutors. The fi ndings of the 
ensuing special investigations by the Parliament and the High Council of Justice 
were often critical, revealing a number of gaps in the protection of the judiciary 
against inappropriate infl uence by the executive, such as the employment of magis-
trates as advisors in the cabinets of members of government. 24 These fi ndings estab-
lished the need for a more thorough scholarly debate on the meaning and extent of 
judicial independence, as guaranteed by the amended article 151 of the Belgian 
Constitution. 25 
4  Taxonomy of Judicial Independence 
 Before article 151 of the Belgian Constitution can be assessed, it must be clear what 
types of judicial independence there are which can function as an evaluative frame 
of reference. In this section, we will describe four basic types. 
24  Commission of Inquiry, Parliamentary Documents: House of Representatives 2008–2009, No. 
52 1711/007, available at  www.dekamer.be ; High Council for Justice, Report of the special inves-
tigation into the functioning of justice following the Fortis case, approved by the general assembly 
of the Council on 16 December 2009, available at  www.hrj.be . For a fi rst discussion of these 
reports, see M Rigaux, ‘Les illusions perdues. Réfl exions à propos du rapport de la commission 
Fortis’ (2009) 6347  Journal des Tribunaux 221; M Rigaux, ‘Le rapport du Conseil supérieur de la 
justice sur l’enquête relative au fonctionnement de l’ordre judiciaire à l’occasion de l’affaire 
Fortis’ (2010) 6385  Journal des Tribunaux 137. 
25  For example, both reports recommend to limit the possibilities for magistrates in function to be 
hired as cabinet advisors by members of government, but whether this should lead to an absolute 
ban or not (including the cabinet of the Minister of Justice, where the input of magistrates could be 
very useful) is matter of dispute. 
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4.1  Individual or Core Independence (A) 
 Judicial independence is strongly guaranteed by Article 151 § 1 of the Belgian 
Constitution, at least as far as the adjudicative function of the  individual judge is 
concerned. In this respect, the phrase ‘[t]he judges are independent in the exercise 
of their competency’ is clear and unqualifi ed: an individual judge must be able to 
take each judicial decision he or she believes to be correct, without any external 
pressure. We might call this the individual or core independence of the judge. This 
type of individual independence is also generally considered to be the most essential 
aspect of any conception of judicial independence, since it is a necessary condition 
for judicial impartiality as well. Among scholars and politicians alike, its value and 
signifi cance for a democratic  rechtsstaat are beyond dispute. 
 Interestingly, before the Belgian constitutional reform of 1998, this phrase was 
 not part of Article 151. The 1998 constitutional legislature seems to have made a 
deliberate choice to confi ne judicial independence to this individual aspect. For 
example, one Member of Parliament said: ‘[t]he reform does not infringe upon the 
constitutionally guaranteed balance of powers, despite what some might say. The 
independence of the judge will not be impaired. But it will nevertheless be more 
clearly defi ned from now on: it doesn’t reach further than the adjudicative function 
of the individual judge’. 26 Another Member of Parliament said that the new text of 
Article 151 should put an end to discussions about the range of judicial indepen-
dence. ‘It means that judges are completely free to decide an individual case’. 
Signifi cantly he added: ‘But there the independence stops’. 27 A contrario it can be 
said that other aspects of judicial independence should according to this politician 
not necessarily be guaranteed by the Belgian legislature. The parliamentary pro-
ceedings contain quite a few statements that confi rm this point of view. 
 The courts in Belgium seem to understand this type of independence rather nar-
rowly. When the Belgian Minister of Justice once made inquiries about a case that 
was pending in a Court of Appeal, his behaviour was questioned in court proceed-
ings. The  Cour de cassation , in its typical language, said that
 ‘…from the sending through, by the Minister of Justice to the  premier président [fi rst chair-
man] of the Court of Appeal of a letter of complaint of one of the parties concerned, about 
the case as it was dealt with in the Court of First Instance, with the comment [by the 
Minister] that ‘you will form an opinion [on this letter] and inform me’…, it cannot be 
concluded that the executive power has unduly interfered with the judicial power, nor can it 
be concluded that the letter by the Minister has been able to impose on the parties the 
impression that the judge was not independent or prejudiced…’ 28 
 What is interesting is that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
never given an abstract or positive defi nition of judicial independence. It usually 
only states that judicial organs should be independent of the executive powers and 
26  Chamber of Representatives, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675/4, 19. 
27  ibid, 29. 
28  Cour de cassation , 22 June 1998,  Algemeen Juridisch Tijdschrift 1999–2000, p. 297. On this and 
other similar cases, see Van Orshoven, Verhey and Wagner,  De onafhankelijkheid van de rechter . 
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parties in proceedings, 29 to be able to arrive freely at a judgement, and subsequently 
only sums up the conditions under which this independence might be guaranteed: 
the appointment procedure, the time of offi ce, the ‘appearance of independence’ and 
the availability of safeguards against external pressure. Yet these factors are merely 
‘indicative’ of independence (and therefore not decisive in themselves). 30 Then 
again, the ECtHR (or the European Commission for Human Rights for that matter) 
does not necessarily seem to consider appointment or dismissal of a magistrate by 
the legislative or executive power an infringement of judicial independence (unless 
it is arbitrary). 31 Moreover, election for judicial offi ce might be considered to be in 
accordance with judicial independence, 32 and the fact that a judge is not appointed 
for life is also not necessarily an infringement of judicial independence. 33 
 The ECtHR also seems to accept accountability of the judiciary to external actors 
or bodies, at least as long as the situation is such that a binding decision cannot ‘be 
altered by a non-judicial authority to the detriment of an individual party…’ This is, 
the Court says, ‘inherent in the very notion of a ‘tribunal’, as is confi rmed by the 
word ‘determination’ (‘ qui décidera ’)…’ 34 
 We believe that the key to understanding the position of the ECtHR is that there 
should be some formal guarantees that individual justices are able to arrive at a free 
and independent judgment (these guarantees are indicative of individual indepen-
dence, but not decisive) and especially that no authority can in any way interfere 
 directly with the decision in an individual case. This last condition is the litmus test. 
 In the remainder of this section, we will describe three more forms of judicial 
independence. These three forms all focus on the dependencies of the judicial 
power, i.e., on all the infl uences that can or might be exerted upon it. These infl u-
ences can be either  proper or  improper . The three types of infl uences we will be 
looking at here are the ones exerted by:
29  cf  Ringeisen v Austria , European Court of Human Rights , Series A, no 13 (1971) 1 EHRR 455, 
para 95, and  Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium , European Court of Human Rights, 
Series A, no 43 (1981) 4 EHRR 1, para 55. 
30  Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom , European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 80 (1985) 
7 EHRR 165, para 78. 
31 Appointment by legislative power:  Crociani and ors v Italy , European Commission on Human 
Rights, 18 December 1980, DR 22, 147 (App no. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79 and 8729/79), para 
10. Appointment by executive power:  Ringeisen v Austria , para 95 and  Campbell and Fell v United 
Kingdom , para 78. Dismissal by executive power:  Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom , para 80 
and  Bryan v United Kingdom , European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 335 (1995) 21 EHRR 
342, para 36. 
32  cf  H v Belgium , European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 127, para 51 (the tribunal in ques-
tion was a disciplinary commission of a Bar authority, in a disbarment case). 
33  cf  Ringeisen v Austria , para 95. 
34  See  Van den Hurk v the Netherlands , European Court of Human Rights, Series A no 288 [1994] 
ECHR 14, para 45. On all this, see V Van Bogaert,  De rechter beoordeeld. Over aansprakelijkheid 
en verantwoordelijkheid in civiel- en staatsrechtelijk perspectief (Maklu, Apeldoorn/Antwerp, 
2005) 363–365. 
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 ‘B’: colleagues amongst each other within the judiciary (i.e., internal 
independence); 
 ‘C’: external agents, which are not state powers, e.g., the media (i.e., extra- 
institutional independence); 
 ‘D’: the other state powers (i.e.,  institutional independence). 
4.2  Internal Independence (B) 
 Individual independence focuses on how the law tries to ensure the independence of 
individual judges when fulfi lling their core duty, i.e., adjudicating cases. There is 
nevertheless another dimension to this issue, which can be dubbed  internal indepen-
dence. This form of independence deals with the factual sources of infl uence and 
control among judges themselves. The question here would be: do judges actually 
infl uence each other when they adjudicate cases, and what does this infl uence 
amount to? It is, as such, virtually impossible to determine whether or not a judge 
has really been infl uenced by his peers or hierarchical superior, unless a judge 
explicitly admits to having been  im properly infl uenced in such a way. 
 This, however, does not dispense a civil justice system from the duty to imple-
ment measures aimed at reducing the risk of improper internal infl uence. 
Unfortunately, the Belgian civil justice system has not yet suffi ciently complied 
with this duty. Some structural guarantees to protect judges from improper internal 
pressure are lacking. For instance, in the current state of Belgian procedural law, the 
court president enjoys extensive powers in the attribution of judges to certain mat-
ters of law, through the assignment of each judge to a specifi c chamber or depart-
ment. There is virtually no independent control as to how these discretionary powers 
are used. There are insuffi cient guarantees that these powers are not used to sanction 
a judge, for example a judge who in a certain case may have ruled in a manner that 
would not be appreciated by his hierarchical superior. The most recent reform of the 
Belgian judicial landscape further increases this risk of improper internal infl uence. 
The reform involves a reduction of the number of judicial districts from 27 to 12, 
with most of the new districts covering a much larger territory than before. The 
reform also includes heightened mobility for tenured judges and empowers the 
court president to transfer his judges from one post to another. The Belgian Council 
of State ( Conseil d’Etat ) has expressed concern that abuse of this power may expose 
magistrates to improper infl uence by their court president. 35 Still, coming up with 
structural measures to eliminate these  improper forms of internal dependence, while 
maintaining the  proper forms of this type of infl uence, is easier said than done. 
Judges need to be protected against random transfers or reassignments, but the jus-
tice system also needs to be protected against dysfunctions resulting from ineffi -
cient work distribution and idle judges. 
35  Conseil d’Etat/Raad van State, full bench opinion of the Legislative Department, nr 53000/AV/3, 
Chamber of Representatives,  Parliamentary Documents , DOC 53-2858/01, 100–105. 
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 A similar dilemma has surfaced in recent case law involving alleged violations 
by judges of their obligation to uphold professional secrecy and the secrets of judi-
cial deliberation. Under Belgian law, magistrates are required to keep confi dential 
all information relating to a specifi c case, other than what was disclosed in public 
hearings and/or in the offi cial judgment after it was delivered. This duty seems to be 
at odds with principles which stress the importance of consultation and discussion. 
Today more than ever, it is considered normal that judges collaborate, share their 
experience and knowledge and confer with each other when confronted with diffi -
cult questions of law or fact. 36 Yet, while information sharing may be a way to 
improve work product quality, for example in terms of exchanging past experiences, 
or in discussing the substance of a case one is solely in charge of, it may also be 
considered a violation of the confi dentiality obligations imposed on judges. This 
became clear in the  Fortis case, which we referred to above, where one justice of the 
Brussels Court of Appeals – who heard the  Fortis case in appeal – was convicted on 
criminal grounds for having shared part of a draft judgment with a retired judge for 
the purpose of proofreading, 37 and the judge who heard the case in fi rst instance was 
later convicted on the same grounds for having shared a draft of her judgment with 
a fellow judge of the same court. 38 Although both of these decisions must be read 
taking into account the complicated context of the  Fortis case, these precedents have 
caused concern among members of the bench. In any case, judges need to be able to 
seek advice among colleagues (not all interaction is necessarily improper), 39 and the 
interpersonal mechanisms at work are almost impossible to regulate, supervise or 
evaluate structurally or effectively. 
4.3  Extra- Institutional Independence (C) 
 The litmus test for extra- institutional independence is whether judges are infl uenced 
by other factual sources besides colleagues and other state powers, such as the 
media. In criminal cases, for example, this might affect the presumption of inno-
cence; judges can then no longer decide independently because their conclusion is 
heavily determined by an external source. As with internal independence, it is nearly 
36  This is illustrated by the fact that newly constructed court buildings are designed with work 
places for teams of judges, whereas older court buildings did not even offer offi ce space for indi-
vidual magistrates. 
37  Cour d’appel , Ghent, 14 September 2011,  Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht 2012, 354 (a motion to 
reverse – ‘ voorziening in cassatie ’ – was rejected by the  Cour de cassation in its decision of 13 
March 2012, nr AR P.11.1750.N, available at  www.juridat.be ). 
38  Cour d’appel Brussels, 21 January 2013, as yet unpublished. 
39 A hard case seems to be when a judge shows a draft judgment to a fellow judge of the same court 
(and not so much where the judge shows her draft judgment to someone who is effectively not a 
judge). 
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impossible to determine whether or not this has been the case. 40 Understandably 
therefore, the Belgian  Cour de cassation seems in this context to work with a ‘pre-
sumption of independence’: unless there is positive or explicit proof of infl uence, 
the judiciary and its judges are presumed to be independent of sources such as the 
media. In a much publicized case in 1998, which dealt with corruption among poli-
ticians, the  Cour simply said that the press coverage ‘was not able to infl uence the 
Court’. 41 
4.4  Institutional Independence (D) 
 What is more controversial, however, is the independence of the judicial power 
from an  institutional point of view. As is clear from Article 151 § 2 of the Belgian 
Constitution, the judiciary as an institution is not totally independent, simply 
because of the external control that is exercised on it by (or through) the High 
Council, or directly by the other branches of government. We will come back to this 
in the next section. 
5  Pride in the Judiciary and the Role and Function 
of the High Council of Justice 
5.1  Objectives, Mission and Composition 
 The establishment of the Belgian High Council of Justice in 1998 served two main 
purposes: introducing judicial accountability and external monitoring of the judicial 
power (with the aim of trying to improve its quality) 42 and getting rid of improper 
political infl uence on the appointment of judges. The main drive behind these two 
aims, as stated before, was to restore public confi dence in the judiciary. 
 The High Council is composed of a French-speaking and a Dutch-speaking sec-
tion, each consisting of 22 members, half of whom are magistrates (directly elected 
amongst magistrates) and the other half non-magistrates (appointed by the Senate). 
40  Perhaps this is all the more so in Belgium which does not really have a tradition of aggressive 
press coverage in pending legal matters, even though media interest in trial coverage in recent 
years seems to have increased. Remarkably, in the past ten years, courts have taken a more open 
attitude towards the press. Most courts have assigned magistrates as press offi cers, dedicated to 
answer journalists’ questions on pending matters. 
41  Cour de cassation , 16 September 1998, (1998)  Journal de Tribunaux 656. 
42  ‘Quality of justice’ refers to the degree by which the justice system meets performance and effi -
ciency criteria, such as the speed and cost of the judicial process, see European Commission for 
the Effi ciency of Justice (Council of Europe) (ed),  Terms of reference of the Working Group on 
quality of justi ce, Extract from the 2014–2015 Activity Programme of the CEPEJ,  www.coe.int/
cepej . 
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Although the High Council is clearly related to the judicial power (since half of its 
members are magistrates), it is nevertheless not part of it 43 : even though it is included 
in the chapter of the Belgian Constitution on the judiciary, it does not have any 
adjudicative functions. 
 The fact that external control and a sort of involvement was being organized was 
heavily criticized by the then  premier président (fi rst chairman) of the  Cour and 
Belgium’s  procureur général (chief prosecutor), the two highest-ranking Belgian 
judicial offi cers. In an advisory note to the Belgian parliament, they protested 
against the fact that judicial independence was, in the legislative proposal establish-
ing the High Council of Justice, restricted to adjudicating cases by the individual 
judge (i.e., the ‘A’ type of judicial independence). According to the two offi cers, the 
Belgian parliament failed to appreciate the importance of  institutional independence 
(type ‘D’) vis-à-vis the other state powers. They also felt ignored, believing that the 
judiciary itself should deal with the matter of judicial independence. They came to 
the conclusion that the composition of the fi rst paragraph of the proposed new 
Article 151 of the Belgian Constitution (see above) led to ambiguity about judicial 
independence, and they suggested that this ‘might be changed’: ‘The proposed text 
can be explained in such a manner that judicial independence is limited to individu-
ally adjudicating cases, thereby neglecting the  institutional independence of the 
courts, i.e., the independent position of the courts towards the other powers in the 
state’. 44 Their protest, however, did not seem to make much of an impression on the 
political class, as it did not have any impact on the proposed constitutional text. 
5.2  Judicial Selection 
 The High Council plays a pivotal role in the selection of judges in Belgium. Belgium 
follows the continental European model of a career judiciary. Judges are primarily 
recruited from junior legal professionals who go through additional judicial training 
but also, though to a lesser extent, from more senior legal professionals who, apart 
from their professional experience, have demonstrated their skills in an entrance 
exam. Judicial appointment is within the purview of the High Council of Justice and 
the executive branch. In a two-stage procedure, applicants fi rst have to demonstrate 
their eligibility by means of a judicial examination and may then apply for nomina-
tion. In both of these stages, the key role for the High Council of Justice is setting 
out the content of the exams and conducting the hearings for nominations. The 
executive branch comes in only when the appointment has to be formalized, upon 
nomination by the High Council of Justice. 
43  On this, P Van Orshoven, ‘De staatsrechtelijke positie van de Hoge Raad voor de Justitie’ in M 
Storme and J Laenens (eds),  In de ban van Octopus – Dans l’encre d’octopus (Brussels, Bruylant, 
2000) 7–8. 
44  Note by IE Liekendael and P Marchal, ‘Het grondwettelijk statuut van het Hof van Cassatie’ in 
Chamber of Representatives, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675, 62. 
M. Adams and B. Allemeersch
Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems - a Comparative Study, edited by Sophie Turenne, Springer International
         Publishing AG, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvtilburg-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3563323.






































 Eligibility for the offi ce of magistrate of the bench is strictly circumscribed in the 
Belgian Judicial Code, which is the main offi cial legislation on legal proceedings 
and organisation of the judiciary. For all positions on the Bench, a candidate must 
be profi cient in the Belgian offi cial languages and hold a Master of Laws degree or 
a PhD in law. The law does not provide for quotas or any special procedures for 
women, minorities or the disabled. 45 As just said, it is moreover necessary to pass a 
professional exam to become eligible. 
 There are, more specifi cally, three pathways to entering the judiciary, which 
depend on the level of prior professional experience. For candidates with little legal 
professional experience, there is a written and oral comparative entrance exam for 
judicial traineeship. The number of vacant positions for judicial trainees is deter-
mined every judicial year by a Royal Decree in Council. The Minister of Justice 
appoints the trainees in the order of their results in the comparative entrance exam. 
There are two types of judicial traineeship, namely the short traineeship of 18 
months that leads only to a position with the Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce, and a long 
traineeship of 3 years, which allows appointment either to the Public Prosecutor’s 
Offi ce or to the Bench. A judicial traineeship includes a theoretical component 
organized by the recently established Institute of Judicial Training ( Instituut voor 
gerechtelijke opleiding /  Institut de formation judiciaire ). It also provides for practi-
cal experience with the Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce, the prison service, the police, the 
Federal Prosecutor’s Offi ce, and a notary or a bailiff, or the legal department of a 
public economic or social institution. In the long traineeship, there is, in addition, 
practical training with a trial court. During the traineeship, the trainee is under the 
supervision of two magistrates of the court or public prosecutor’s offi ce, where he 
or she is training, who evaluate his or her performance. Moreover, all judicial train-
ees are evaluated by a commission for the evaluation of judicial traineeship, which 
is composed of magistrates and education experts. 
 For experienced lawyers, there is a professional capabilities exam. This exam is 
similar to the one described above, but provides direct access to the judiciary with-
out the need to complete a traineeship. The candidates who pass the exam obtain a 
certifi cate of professional ability, which gives them the right to apply for a judgeship 
within a period of 7 years. 
 For lawyers with a minimum of 20 years’ practice at the Bar who want to enter 
the Bench, there is an oral evaluation exam. This involves a meeting with three hear-
ing groups drawn from the nomination and appointments committee of the High 
Council of Justice. Discussions deal with the motivation of the candidate and his 
ideas about his future career, his knowledge of the law, and his abilities relevant to 
the function of a magistrate. The nomination and appointments committee gives its 
45  Statistics published by the Ministry of Justice show that the proportion of women amongst mag-
istrates has increased signifi cantly. In 2006, the Ministry counted approximately 1,050 female 
magistrates and 1,350 male magistrates. By 2011, the balance was approximately 1,200 women 
against 1,275 men (FOD Justitie,  Justitie in cijfers 2012 , 9, available at  www.just.fgov.be ). The 
Ministry does not publish records on the number of magistrates according to other criteria, such as 
disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity. 
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decision on the basis of the reports of the three hearing groups and the advice of a 
representative of the Bar. If successful, the candidate obtains an evaluation attesta-
tion, which is valid for 3 years. The maximum number of judges recruited by means 
of the oral evaluation exam is 12 % of the total number of magistrates at the level of 
the Court of Appeal in the relevant judicial district. 46 In recent years, the High 
Council has continued to improve this process to make it as professional as possible. 
For example, new exam forms have been developed, behavioural interview tech-
niques have been introduced and research has been undertaken on the use of innova-
tive psychological tests. 
 Similar to the eligibility requirements, the process of the actual selection of mag-
istrates among eligible candidates is also regulated in quite some detail in the 
Belgian Judicial Code, which is the main offi cial legislation on legal proceedings 
and organisation of the judiciary. It is required that each vacancy for the position of 
judge is published online. Previously, judges were in principle appointed directly by 
the executive branch, which led to the politicization of these appointments. The 
creation of the High Council of Justice in 1998 has curtailed the responsibility and 
the powers of the executive in respect of the appointment of judges. Though judges 
continue to be appointed by the executive branch, the relevant appointments com-
mittee of the High Council of Justice bases the appointment on a motivated nomina-
tion of the candidate after an evaluation of competence and qualifi cation. The 
nomination can only be made with a two-thirds majority. The executive branch can 
reject the nomination, but is required to state its reasons for doing so. The High 
Council then has 15 days to issue a new nomination. There are no data available on 
the frequency of rejection, but it is said to happen rarely, if ever. After the 1998 
reforms, the High Council almost immediately acquired a moral authority in the 
selection process that the executive branch is very reluctant to challenge. 
 While the reform is broadly approved, critics say that there is still a degree of 
political and ideological infl uence in the nomination and promotion process, and 
that the transparency of the nomination process is still subject to improvement. 
Their concern is centred around the composition of the High Council. Half of its 
members are, as we have already seen, representatives of the magistrates, both of 
the bench and the prosecutor’s offi ce, and are appointed in an offi cial election 
among the magistrates. The other half of its members are appointed by the Senate 
(with a two-thirds majority). 47 Critics have expressed a double concern about the 
appointment process. 48 On one hand, the procedural guarantees for a fair election 
46  This maximum is set relatively low, to ensure suffi cient job openings for the younger, less expe-
rienced candidates entering the judicial career through the judicial traineeship programme. 
47  The Senate has full discretion of appointment but is bound by a number of criteria. The Senate 
appoints candidates who are not magistrates and there are quotas for language (50/50 Dutch- and 
French-speaking, with at least 1 magistrate with suffi cient knowledge of German) and sex (at least 
four women in each language group), as well as professional qualifi cation (e.g. at least four law-
yers with min. 10 years of experience at the bar and at least three university professors). 
48  J Nolf, ‘Vertrouwen: het sleutelwoord verdwijnt’,  De Juristenkrant (26 September 2012), 11. 
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of representatives by the magistrates are insuffi cient, as no independent body exists 
to supervise the election process. On the other hand, the appointment of non- 
magistrates by the Senate creates the potential for indirect political infl uence on the 
functioning of the High Council. This risk was highlighted last year when the 
Council was renewed and the Senate appointed a former Minister of Justice as well 
as the wife of a former Minister and Euro-Commissioner. Observers indicated that 
this development might lead to political or ideological labels infl uencing the 
Council’s assessment of applicants. It is diffi cult to evaluate these comments due 
to the confi dentiality of the selection process, which is based on the candidates’ 
right to privacy. However, when recently questioned by the specialized press about 
these concerns, former members of the High Council stated, without exception, 
either that they had never observed any political or ideological infl uence or, alter-
natively, that even when they suspected some bias, the diversity in the selection 
committee and its vast autonomy turned out to be a more than suffi cient guarantee 
of objectivity in the outcome. They added that full objectivity is utopian and that 
95 % of fully objective nominations is in any event the highest attainable level. 49 
The result of the process in the last 10 years, with highly qualifi ed lawyers being 
selected and its outcome relatively rarely contested, seems to support these 
statements. 
 The appointment of lay judges in the labour and commercial courts, where they 
assist professional judges, 50 is still largely within executive discretion. There is no 
nomination by the High Council of Justice and no formal assessment. 51 This is prob-
lematic, as lay judges have an important stake in the judicial activity of labour and 
commercial courts where they outnumber professional judges two to one. The lack 
of an objective system for the appointment of lay judges was painfully exposed in 
the aftermath of a recent highly publicized controversy in the country’s most impor-
tant commercial court, the Commercial Court of Brussels. In the context of an 
investigation into possible professional misconduct by the President of the Brussels 
Commercial Court, the popular press published revelations about an important 
 creditor of the President having been appointed a lay judge (and later also a judicial 
expert) at the same court. It was suggested that the President had secured this 
appointment for her creditor. It is unclear whether any improper misconduct had 
really occurred, but the story did cast doubt on the objectivity and thoroughness of 
the selection process for lay judges. 
49  B Aerts and R Boone, ‘Hoge Raad voor de Justitie na 10 jaar. “95 procent objectieve benoemin-
gen is het hoogst haalbare”’ (2010) 207  De Juristenkrant , 8–9. 
50  Usually, one professional judge presides the chambers, with two lay judges as deputies. The lay 
judges have equal saying in the decision-making process, although most often the professional 
judge is likely to be the most infl uential. 
51  For lay judges in the labour courts, the appointments are made on the basis of endorsements 
made by the representative organisations of employers on the one hand and of the trade unions on 
the other (Art 199, Judicial Code). For lay judges in the commercial courts, applications are open 
to every candidate who is minimum 30 years old and has at least 5 years of business experience. 
4 Re-forming a Meritorious Elite. Judicial Independence, Selection of Judges…
Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems - a Comparative Study, edited by Sophie Turenne, Springer International
         Publishing AG, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvtilburg-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3563323.






































5.3  Other Responsibilities of the High Council 
 The High Council also has many what might be called administrative tasks. For 
example, within each (legally required) language group there is an Appointment 
and Indication Committee as well as an Advice and Research Committee. The for-
mer advises on candidates for judicial positions, for court presidencies and for the 
position of Chief Prosecutor. When someone is nominated for such an appointment, 
the King (in effect the Minister of Justice) has to approve the candidate. The latter 
committee can provide advice (and do research) on what is in article 151 § 3 (6) 
vaguely described as ‘Providing advice and formulating proposals concerning the 
working and the organization of the judicial power’. It can do so either on its own 
initiative or at the request of the Chamber of Representatives, the Senate or the 
Minister of Justice. 
 For the rest, the High Council sets the standards of access to a position as judge 
or prosecutor (and organizes the entrance exams); sets guidelines for and organizes 
judicial training programmes; provides additional training for magistrates; and 
defi nes profi les for court presidents and the Chief Prosecutor. Finally, and impor-
tantly, the High Council can also deal with complaints about the performance of the 
judiciary. 
 Given all these tasks, Montesquieu would probably have classifi ed the High 
Council as being part of the executive power. Yet, the Belgian parliament has repeat-
edly stressed that the High Council cannot be considered part of any of the tradi-
tional powers of the state. It would therefore seem to be a  sui generis institution. 
5.4  Impact on Judicial Independence 
 Which of the Council’s duties do or could infringe on judicial independence? The 
starting point of our analysis here remains that the concept of individual or core 
independence must be guaranteed at all times. Three types of external control might 
be distinguished: (1)  improper external control, i.e., external control that clearly 
infringes individual independence; (2)  borderline external control, i.e., external 
control whose infl uence on individual independence can be, in practice, both proper 
and improper; and (3)  proper external control, i.e., external control that clearly does 
not infringe individual independence. 
 As far as  improper external control is concerned, the provisions of the Belgian 
Constitution referred to do not seem to contain instances of external interference 
that are clearly or necessarily improper from the outset, i.e., external interference 
that can alter or direct an individual decision. 
 We can also be fairly brief about  proper external control. The fi rst fi ve duties 
assigned to the High Council (through Article 151 § 3, subparagraphs 1 through 5 
of the Belgian Constitution, see above) appear to be rather unproblematic. One 
might be critical of the judiciary’s loss of power to appoint chief judges itself (this 
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now falls to the Minister of Justice (formally the King) on the advice of the High 
Council), but when the courts were in possession of this power, they appointed 
judges solely by seniority, regardless of any management capacities. 
 On the basis of Article 151 § 3 (6) of the Belgian Constitution, the High Council 
is competent to give advice and formulate proposals on how the judiciary works, on 
legislative proposals concerning the judiciary, and on how the judiciary should be 
funded. Of course, when its advice and proposals are followed up, the Council can 
be said to have an infl uence over the  working conditions of individual judges 
(although not directly on the decisions rendered in specifi c cases). 
 Yet, since half of the High Council consists of magistrates that have been co- 
opted by their peers, the High Council can also be understood as a self-regulatory 
body. That might in practice diminish the risk of the High Council readily infringing 
upon the individual independence of the judiciary; the judiciary might indeed, as 
elites usually do, see an interest in preserving its established position (more on this 
in the next section). But at the same time, complete  institutional independence is 
virtually impossible in practice because the judicial power has always, and neces-
sarily so, been dependent on the other powers of the state (in terms of salaries, 
fi nancial means, buildings, books and secretaries, recruitment, etc.). We add that, 
because of its mixed composition, the High Council can be understood as the voice 
of the judiciary  vis-à-vis the legislative and executive powers – an example of 
 démocratie participative . 52 
 As far as  borderline external control is concerned, two of the High Council’s 
tasks are particularly interesting here. The fi rst of these is the Council’s power to 
supervise the internal mechanisms of control (Article 151 § 3 (7)), the second the 
Council’s exclusive right to receive and follow up on complaints about how the 
judiciary operates (Article 151 §3 (8), fi rst line). In both cases it seems to be impor-
tant that the High Council exercises restraint in performing its duties. Both tasks 
have the potential to develop from  borderline external control to  improper external 
control. To be more precise, the substance of complaints about individual cases 
should in no way be infl uenced by external control. 53 Article 151 § 3 (8) therefore 
also stresses that whenever the High Council receives complaints or information 
relating to disciplinary or criminal proceedings, it has to forward this information to 
the proper institutions. 
 Our conclusion is that the monitoring of the judiciary by the High Council of 
Justice is from a legal perspective a form of proper external control, but that some 
of the Council’s duties call for vigilance to ensure that they do not infringe indi-
vidual judicial independence. This fi nding is of particular concern in the light of 
52  D De Bruyn, as quoted by Velaers. ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht na de recente 
herziening van de Grondwet’. 
53  This was also stressed in the parliamentary proceedings. See Chamber of Representatives, 
‘Parliamentary Proceedings 1997–98’, no 1675/1, p. 8–9, and Senate, ‘Parliamentary Proceedings 
1998–99’, no 1-1121/3, p. 8. See also Velaers, ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht na 
de recente herziening van de Grondwet’. 
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questions about the Council’s political neutrality, as raised by observers. 54 Some 
further thought should be given to how this ‘fourth power’, as it is called by some, 55 
could be subjected to suffi cient control without seeing its independence compro-
mised. This being said, the Council could certainly do more to reassure its critics by 
showing more transparency in respect of its functioning, addressing concerns about 
its neutrality in a public debate and showing more self-criticism when it comes to 
evaluating its own performance. 
6  Eliminating Prejudice: Why External Control 
on the Judiciary Might Be Viable 
 The question remains why some seem to advance a very broad and unqualifi ed defi -
nition of judicial independence, one not limited to individual independence but also 
encompassing  institutional independence. It was exactly this stance, as we related 
earlier in this article, which was adopted jointly in Belgium by the two highest judi-
cial offi cers of the country. The answer might well be that, like any powerful elite, the 
judiciary has its own established interests to protect which might be threatened by the 
introduction of greater accountability. 56 This, however, does not change the fact that 
the concerns voiced by these two judicial functionaries are in principle legitimate. 
The point here is merely that their arguments can be used as a trump card against  any 
change (with the accompanying poor refl ection on its working laying ahead). 57 
 As we have argued, and contrary to the view of these two high-ranking magis-
trates, the external monitoring of the judiciary as performed by the High Council is 
not necessarily a  legally improper infringement of judicial independence. But much 
depends on how judicial independence is defi ned and understood. If it is considered 
to be an individual requirement, external accountability (through, for example, an 
institution such as a High Council of Justice) might well be compatible with judicial 
independence. The advantage of a defi nition of judicial independence that focuses 
on individual independence (as in the defi nition we endorse here) is therefore that it 
allows judicial accountability play a role. 58 Formulated like this however, this clearly 
is merely a semantic argument. The real question is of course whether such a defi ni-
tion and its related judicial accountability are a good thing. To put it differently: 
what reasons are there to hold the judiciary in Belgium  as an institution publicly 
accountable? 
 Aside from the fact that there seemed to be a need for this in Belgium after the 
events described in paragraph 2, an important – more general – reason for this is that 
54  Nolf, ‘Vertrouwen: het sleutelwoord verdwijnt’. 
55  ibid. 
56  K Malleson,  The New Judiciary, 78. 
57  ibid. 
58  ibid. 
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in the last decades, the courts have, almost involuntarily, been playing an  increasingly 
important role in society. The courts have found themselves ever more drawn into 
counterbalancing an overbearing bureaucratic machinery. This development is 
mainly the result of the increasingly intensive legislative and regulatory action on 
the part of the public authorities. Today, legislation and public policy are largely 
viewed as instruments to achieve social, economic and cultural change. Moreover, 
the rise of the welfare state, as well as various developments in the realm of science 
and technology, have compelled the authorities to intervene. They have come to take 
on a more active role not only out of choice, but also out of dire necessity. The 
growth of legislation governing the environment, casual work, the multicultural 
society, new social risks or biotechnical developments are all examples of this trend. 
 In this context it is fair to say that the law is also increasingly linking complex 
sets of interests in ever more complex situations, and in an ever more multi-level 
globalising legal order. As a result, the courts can no longer confi ne themselves to 
applying the legal rule which expresses the various interests as weighed by the leg-
islator. They are increasingly expected to weigh the interests in question them-
selves. 59 More and more, the courts have to derive from the available rules the 
standards – think of principles of proper administration, but also demarcations of 
responsibilities, discretionary powers, vague rules, etc. – on the basis of which they 
must assess the extent to which particular interests are being legally protected. One 
need only consider court decisions relating to, for example, strikes, closures of busi-
nesses, the economic crisis, disputes concerning environmental and consumer pro-
tection. From this perspective, the resulting judicial dynamic is an essential element 
in enabling the legal system to operate satisfactorily as a forum for organising social 
trends and relationships, and as a mechanism for the resolution of the confl icts to 
which these trends and relationships can give rise. 
 In view of this development, the call for greater accountability by means of 
external control is understandable and might even be reconcilable with a modern 
view of the  Trias Politica . The  Trias Politica is usually attributed to Montesquieu. 60 
It is supposed by many that Montesquieu used this doctrine to advocate the division 
of state power into a legislative, an executive and a judicial power and that these 
three powers should be kept  separate . 61 As a result, each power must be vigilant that 
the other two powers remain within the bounds of their constitutional authority. 
However, what Montesquieu desired was not so much the  separation of powers. 
More than anything else, he focused on the principle of moderate governance ( gou-
vernement modéré ), whereby the exercise of power by each branch of government 
would proceed along different levels, and where each of the branches could then 
59  EMH Hirsch Ballin, ‘Onafhankelijke rechtsvorming’ in  Rechtsstaat & Beleid (Zwolle, Tjeenk 
Willink, 1991) 296. 
60  John Locke (1632–1705) of course defi ned an earlier version of the idea of  Trias Politica , in 
which the judicial power was part of the executive. 
61  C Eisenmann, ‘La pensée constitutionnelle de Montesquieu’ in B Mirkine-Guetzévitch and H 
Puget,  La pensée politique et constitutionnelle de Montesquieu: bicentenaire de L’esprit des lois 
1748–1948 (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1952) 133. 
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keep the other branches suffi ciently in check to avoid arbitrariness and the excessive 
exercise of state power. 62 
 At this point, two assertions can be made: (1) the judiciary can act as an autono-
mous  counterweight against an overbearing legislature in an ever more complex 
society; and (2) the judiciary itself should be held accountable for its growing role 
in society. Such an approach sits well with the idea that the judiciary can under the 
aforementioned circumstances best be perceived as a  compensating actor , which 
can make good an imbalance when it arises, because of the foregoing, in the rela-
tionship between the state and its citizens. It also sits well with a concept of the 
 Trias Politica that is not an abstract one, but an essentially relational one. How the 
 Trias Politica should be understood in a specifi c situation is dependent on how the 
state powers perform their tasks, how in effect they relate to each other. In the con-
text of this chapter, this means that when the judiciary becomes a more autonomous 
and dynamic actor as a result of the developments we just described, this should 
also imply greater accountability of the judiciary towards the society in which it 
functions; the  Trias Politica as a system of compensating strategies. So if the judi-
ciary is getting and taking more adjudicative liberty, it should also pay up in terms 
of responsibility towards the society it is serving. In any case, autonomy and respon-
sibility come with accountability, and independence is not the same as being 
untouchable. That might well be, in this context, an important lesson to be learnt 
from Montesquieu. Increased accountability might also be conducive to public sup-
port for the judiciary. And this is very important indeed because a judiciary that is 
not supported by the public it is meant to serve can itself endanger the democratic 
state of affairs, as the Belgian Dutroux case, with which we dealt in Sect.  2 of this 
chapter, so clearly showed. 
 Seen from this angle, the two highest judicial offi cers in Belgium, as referred to 
above, do not seem to have been aware of the changing environment the judiciary is 
working in. It seems that they want to understand judicial independence from some 
fi xed or absolute point of view (‘judicial independence can only sensibly exist if it 
is understood as to encompass  institutional independence too’). But in times of 
scarcity of public means, a call for accountability is also about what we might call 
the positive obligation on the part of the legislator to make the modern  rechtsstaat 
work. Quality control is an element in this. From this point of view, it might well be 
that the legislator should be held responsible for this: it might in any case in 
Strasbourg be diffi cult to explain that the possible malfunctioning of the judicial 
sector results from the lack of a system of quality control. 63 
62  W Witteveen,  Evenwicht van machten (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1991). To avoid misunderstand-
ing: Montesquieu can be interpreted in different ways here. Also critically on the idea of  Trias 
Politica as  separation of powers , see I Stewart ‘Montesquieu in England: His ‘Notes on England’, 
with Commentary and Translation’ (2002), available at:  http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/montes-
quieu.shtml 
63 AFM Brenninkmeier, ‘De reorganisatie van de rechtspleging en de onafhankelijkheid van de 
rechter’ (2002)  NJCM-Bulletin 24. 
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7  Final Remarks 
 We submit that from a legal as well as a societal point of view the judicial reform in 
Belgium involving the establishment of the High Council of Justice is not necessar-
ily problematic. External monitoring of the judiciary can, in a modern welfare state, 
be a legitimate policy to be pursued by the legislative and executive powers. The 
judiciary, as an institution, can be held accountable for its performance. We add that 
this can even be seen as a guarantee of independence against the political branches 
of government. Mechanisms that seek to promote professional qualities are also an 
essential means for the new judiciary to demonstrate its democratic legitimacy. This 
is also the key to retaining and strengthening public confi dence in the judiciary, 
which in turn would reinforce judicial independence. 64 
 All this does not mean that a dynamic High Council of Justice is always unprob-
lematic. One of the reasons for this has been touched upon in the introduction of this 
chapter: the establishment of an institution like the Belgian High Council is inti-
mately bound to highly contextual circumstances, and what is good for one jurisdic-
tion or country might thus not be good for another. But even when it could be 
sensible to establish such a council, than it is still true that alertness is required to 
ensure that under the pretence of checks and balances no new unchecked power 
positions are being taken up. This, too, is a lesson to be learned from Montesquieu. 
Therefore, the Belgian High Council of Justice should not perform its duties in a 
vacuum; it should itself be monitored and be held accountable, for example, by the 
public, by a free press or even by the judiciary itself (e.g., the European Court of 
Human Rights). 65 
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